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A REPUBLICAN CHIEF JUSTICE 
Mark V. Tushnet* 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Sue Davis. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1989. Pp. x, 247. $19.95. 
Sue Davis1 describes her work as an analysis of Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist's "legal philosophy by utilizing his judicial opinions 
. . . with the goal of understanding his methods and values and the 
way they translate into judicial opinions."2 Early in the book she un-
wittingly provides evidence of the hazard of that enterprise. She 
quotes Chief Justice Rehnquist's response to Senator John Tunney's 
question about how Rehnquist would apply the due process clause to 
the issue of whether television should be allowed in the courtroom: "I 
would be inclined to go back to the debates, the Bingham explanation 
of what he meant by the 14th amendment, other explanations on the 
floor .... "3 Knowing that Chief Justice Rehnquist has not often writ-
ten opinions dealing with the intent of the framers of other provisions 
of the Constitution, I did a LEXIS search to discover how often Jus-
tice Rehnquist had actually "gone back to the Bingham explanation."4 
Taking what I regard to be a generous attitude, I concluded that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has written two opinions relying on the Bingham 
explanation, and that neither used Bingham in a way that would be 
considered central to the contemporary issues of interpreting the 
amendment.5 More striking to me were the cases in which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined or wrote opinions that ignored forceful contrary 
understandings of what I would suppose most people would think was 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, 
M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. -Ed. I would like to thank Gerry Spann for his comments on this 
review and Nicolette Tapay for her research assistance. 
1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
2. P. vii. Davis' study examines the period from 1971 to 1986, when then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist was named Chief Justice. For convenience, I use his current title throughout. 
3. P. 9 (quoting Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 190 (1971)). 
4. The search, conducted on September 11, 1989, was on "Bingham and Rehnquist," and 
yielded about 20 cases in which the right Bingham was mentioned. This proved to be more 
tricky than I expected, because the search turned up a number of cases involving aspects of the 
interpretation of two civil rights acts that are related to, but different from, the fourteenth 
amendment. 
5. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 26 (1974), squarely relies on Bingham's discussion of 
§ 2 of the fourteenth amendment; General Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 
(1982) couples recent interpretations of the fourteenth amendment with Bingham's statement 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does no more than enact constitutional norms in a way that yields the 
conclusion that§ 1981 prohibits only intentional discrimination. 
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meant by "the Bingham explanation," that is, Representative Bing-
ham's statements about the primary purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment. 6 Of course, it may be that Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
not yet confronted a case in which reference to the history of the fram-
ing of the fourteenth amendment was relevant.7 More likely, though, 
Rehnquist's representations during his confirmation hearings, sincere 
as they may have been, did not take account of the realities of contem-
porary constitutional adjudication. 
There are two aspects of those realities that deserve mention here. 
The first is the bureaucratization of the Supreme Court, particularly 
the increasingly heavy reliance of the Justices on law clerks for the 
drafting of substantial portions of their opinions. In the nature of 
things, of course, it is extremely difficult to get accurate information 
about the drafting process in the chambers of a sitting Justice, but I 
would be extremely surprised to discover that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
did much more than supervise - "edit" is the polite term - the work 
product of his law clerks. I do not intend this as a criticism; Justices 
of the Supreme Court should now be seen as senior partners in little 
law firms, 8 and it is the rare senior partner who puts pen to paper (or 
hand to word processor) these days. 
The way in which the Court works today makes it quite hazardous 
to impute to a Justice very many of the details of the opinions emerg-
ing from his or her chambers. The Justice is responsible for the bot-
tom-line result and for the broad contours of positions asserted 
consistently over the course of his or her career, but not for much 
more. That makes Davis' enterprise particularly appropriate for a 
political scientist. Lawyers have professional reasons to pay close at-
tention to the articulated reasoning in judicial opinions, for it is that 
reasoning that gives us the opportunity to advance our clients' inter-
ests within the framework of results reached by the Court. If we can 
discover an inconsistency, or a clever reading that allows us to limit an 
adverse precedent or expand a favorable one, we have done our job. 
That makes us less attentive to patterns of results than political scien-
tists have been. They have been concerned with the many ways in 
which the Court operates within the overall political system of the 
United States, and therefore have taken seriously the patterns of re-
sults the Court has reached. 
The second aspect of the Court's contemporary work that makes it 
6. Many of these understandings had been expressed by the Court itself in prior opinions. In 
addition to General Building Contractors, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
7. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (mentioning 
legal status of abortion in 1868). 
8. See, e.g., D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
122, 127-29 (1986). 
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hazardous to write about a Justice's legal philosophy is the politiciza-
. tion of constitutional law. One could account for perhaps ninety per-
cent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results· by looking, not at 
anything in the ·united States Reports, but rather at the platforms of 
the Republican Party.9 Making the point precise is, unfortunately, 
rather difficult. The platform of the Republican Party does not ad-
dress every issue that comes before the Supreme Court, so one would 
have to guess what the platform would say if it addressed the issues 
confronting Chief Justice Rehnquist. Further, the Republican Party is 
not a completely ideological party, which makes predicting a "Repub-
lican" position on every issue hazardous. Davis denies that "Rehn-
quist [is] simply a right-wing ideologue determined to use the Court to 
further his own political agenda" (p. 21). Even if this denial were true, 
it does not establish that Rehnquist has some "constitutional philoso-
phy" that is independent of the political agenda of the Republican 
Party, at least if, as certainly seems to be the case, the Republican 
Party is not simply a right-wing ideological party. 
I do not mean the reduction of constitutional adjudication to party 
politics as a criticism of the Chief Justice, for much the same could be 
said of almost all of his colleagues, with the obvious changes in refer-
ence to the platform of the other party in the appropriate cases. The 
point is complicated even more by the fact that, just as constitutional 
law has been overtly politicized, so too has politics been constitutional-
ized, in the sense that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish positions 
taken by the political parties as a matter of political principle from 
those taken with reference, positive or negative, to constitutional law. 
The Republican Party position on abortion, for example, is a complex 
mixture of pure principle {abortion as the taking of innocent life) and 
constitutional law (Roe v. Wade as a judicial usurpation of power 
properly located in democratic legislatures). Politicians may some-
times have to sort out this mixture; for example, when Roe is over-
ruled, Republicans will have to decide whether to support laws 
adopting the pro-choice position that have majority backing. Judges, 
happily for them, do not have to make the same distinction. But, the 
unhappy result for authors of works like Davis' is that there will rarely 
be evidence to disconfirm the hypothesis that the Justice's opinion is 
simply a reflection of his political positions. 
Davis' primary argument is that that hypothesis is wrong in Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's case. Davis' argument has two parts. First, she 
identifies a ranking of values in the Chief Justice's decisions. Second, 
she seeks to explain the Chief Justice's apparent deviation from this 
ranking in particular cases. I find the argument unpersuasive. 
9. A substantial part of the residue can be accounted for by referring to matters like prudence 
in expending one's capital within the Supreme Court on lost causes like the independent prosecu-
tor problem. See Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1989). 
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In the first part, her analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions 
and votes leads her to conclude that he places the highest value on 
federalism, somewhat less value on the protection of private property, 
and even less value on the protection of individual rights other than 
property. I take it that this is not hot news. Nor, in itself, could it 
possibly disconfirm the political hypothesis, for that ranking of values 
is the one contained in Republican party platforms as well. Even 
more, however, this ranking does not account for at least some impor-
tant positions that the Chief Justice has taken. 
I should begin by acknowledging that the Chief Justice's positions 
are not always what one would expect of a standard right-wing ideo-
logue. In particular, Davis' explanation of his skepticism about the 
Court's commercial speech doctrine, and of his refusal to accord the 
full protection of the first amendment to corporate political activity, is 
persuasive. She argues that these positions reflect the importance that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist gives to federalism as compared even to the 
protection of private property (pp. 82-85). And, she properly notes 
that in cases involving national regulation of corporate political activ-
ity - cases where federalism is not implicated - the Chief Justice has 
upheld the rights of corporations against national regulation.10 Even 
here, the crass political account cannot really be rejected, for, at least 
at the level of generality inherent in Davis' specification of values, it is 
unclear what the position of the Republican party is on the question of 
commercial speech; it seems plausible to me that the Republican party 
of George Bush and of Richard Nixon (perhaps more important be-
cause he appointed William Rehnquist to the Supreme Court) might 
be skeptical about the value of deregulating commercial speech. 
There are, however, two areas in which the Chief Justice's posi-
tions are inconsistent with the ranking of values Davis offers. The 
more important area is affirmative action, where the Chief Justice has 
been enthusiastic about overriding both federalism (voluntary choices 
made by local jurisdictions to institute affirmative action programs). 
and private property (voluntary choices made by corporations to insti-
tute such programs) in the name of the individual rights of white men 
to be free of discrimination. Davis manages to avoid discussing this 
area by treating Chief Justice Rehnquist's positions in affirmative ac-
tion cases as solely involving questions of statutory interpretation, as 
in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 11 Of course, it would be 
unfair to tax her too severely for failing to make the quite understand-
able projection of his position into the constitutional arena, as has oc-
10. P. 76. One might make the same point in connection with his widely noted opinion in 
Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), which falls outside the period studied by Davis. 
11. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (involving the application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982), to a voluntary affirmative action plan). 
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curred in the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 12 
Nonetheless, there is Fullilove v. Klutznick, 13 which was decided dur-
ing the period on which Davis concentrates. I concede immediately 
that because Fullilove involves national legislation that benefits some 
private property owners and disadvantages others, Rehnquist's vote to 
hold the statute unconstitutional does not directly demonstrate that in 
this area he values individual rights over private property and federal-
ism. Surely, though, at some point one could fairly project what his 
position on the constitutionality of local affirmative action programs 
would be. 
Davis does discuss the second area in which Chief Justice Rehn-
. quist has subordinated federalism to private property rights: constitu-
tional constraints on state legislation in the takings and contracts 
clauses. The way in which she explains his apparent deviation in this 
area constitutes the second part of her overall argument. Yet, if the 
first part cannot help us distinguish between the Chief Justice's rank-
ing of values and the Republican party's ranking of values because the 
specification occurs at too high a level of generality, the second part of 
Davis' argument ultimately cannot explain his deviations. It fails for 
exactly the same reason: the high level of generality on which it oper-
ates. These deviations might better be accounted for by looking to the 
values of the Republican party directly. 
In the area of constitutional constraints on state legislation in the 
takings and contracts clauses, Chief Justice Rehnquist has voted in 
favor of restricting the authority of states to regulate the consequences 
of capital relocation, 14 and in favor of restricting the authority of 
states to condition development of private property on compliance 
with the state's desired social agenda. 15 Obviously, these positions are 
not consistent with Davis' hypothesized ranking of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's values. She attempts to account for them by referring to 
the other component of her analysis, in which she identifies three as-
pects of a general approach to constitutional adjudication that she be-
lieves underlie Rehnquist's ranking of values. 
This general approach consists of (1) a "democratic model" of gov-
ernment, that is, a fairly strict and simple-minded majoritarianism, (2) 
moral relativism, and (3) an approach to interpretation that focuses on 
text and intent (pp. 24-32). It should be immediately apparent that 
there is going to be trouble with the first two of these aspects. The 
"democratic model" runs into difficulties from two directions. Nose-
rious political theorist defines democracy as simple majoritarianism, 
but rather treats it as a system in which majority rule is supplemented 
12. 109 s. Ct. 706 (1989). 
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (joining Stewart, J., dissenting). 
14. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
15. Nollan v. California State Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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by some notion of individual rights. That notion, it is generally 
agreed, must be substantive. Yet, in Davis' account, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's theory of individual rights resides in his approach to inter-
pretation. Thus, the "democratic model" does no work in explaining 
his resolution of particular questions of constitutional value. From 
another direction, there is an obvious tension between majoritarianism 
and the idea of constitutional limitations on the power of government, 
which, again, can be resolved only by reference to some substantive 
theory. 
Perhaps this is too abrupt, though, in light of my opening observa-
tions about the contemporary conditions of adjudication. That is, 
even if serious political thinkers know that there is a tension between 
majoritarianism and constitutionalism, there is no particular reason to 
think that Justices of the Supreme Court are serious political thinkers. 
Rough gestures in the appropriate direction - "majority rule" for 
contemporary conservatives, "individual rights" for contemporary lib-
erals - are all that they need make in order to define for their constit-
uencies what their positions are. It is my experience, for example, that 
contemporary conservatives feel no cognitive dissonance whatsoever 
about their simultaneous devotion to federalism and opposition to af-
firmative action. But this is to say, once again, that, at least to this 
point, Davis' account of Rehnquist's ranking of values and his ap-
proach to adjudication gives us no reason to reject the view that he is, 
simply, a Republican judge. 
The second element in Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach to adju-
dication, according to Davis, is moral relativism. This seems to me 
simply wrong, or at least so substantially overstated that the idea of 
moral relativism can do little work in explaining Rehnquist's judicial 
performance. Davis confuses a position about the appropriate institu-
tional role of a judge in constitutional cases with a position about 
moral reality. Chief Justice Rehnquist does appear to believe that, 
from a judge's point of view, there are no standards other than those 
adopted by a majority against which the morality of legislation can be 
assessed, 16 but that is very different from believing, as for example Jus-
tice Holmes might have, that one person's assessment of what is moral 
is just as good as another person's. A moral relativist judge, in the 
only useful sense of that term, would have to uphold legislation that he 
or she believed was really wrong - not simply erroneous as a matter 
of public policy, but fundamentally wrong. Yet Davis gives us no evi-
dence, and I doubt there is any, that Chief Justice Rehnquist has ever 
done that. Indeed, to the extent that the prime anomaly in his behav-
ior, under Davis' account, is his support for private property against 
federalism in the context of takings and the contracts clause, we ap-
16. See pp. 26-27. 
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pear to have evidence that the Chief Justice is not a moral relativist.17 
With Davis' third element of Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach 
to constitutional interpretation - a focus on text and intent - we 
come to her explanation for his deviation from the imputed ranking of 
values. According to Davis, these deviations are explicable because in 
these cases - and presumably not in others - the text of the Consti-
tution and the intent of its framers reverse the ordinary hierarchy of 
values. In the contracts clause, for example, according to Davis, the 
Chief Justice finds an "express provision" of the Constitution that 
places private property above federalism. "It is possible that, in his 
view, the contract clause, which is an express limit on the states, pro-
vides a clearer restriction on state action than . . . the due process 
clause, which is limited to procedural requirements that the states 
themselves may define" (pp. 129-30). Indeed, according to Davis, we 
can understand Chief Justice Rehnquist's general ranking of values, 
and in particular his preference for private property over individual 
rights, as a reflection of this same understanding of text and intent (pp. 
35-36). 
Qualified in this way - by the use of the phrase "it is possible that 
... " - it is difficult to disagree with Davis' position. Unfortunately, 
similarly qualified statements could be made about essentially any po-
sition inconsistent with any imputed hierarchy of values, and could 
explain virtually any hierarchy of values. To make sense of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's position as presented by Davis, we would need a fairly 
precise definition of what an "express limit" is and how it is to be 
distinguished from a less-than-express limit. What immediately comes 
to mind is the express limit on national authority in the first amend-
ment, and Justice Black's exhortation that "no law means no law." 18 
We can put aside for a moment the difficulties with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's reservations about the application of the full Bill of Rights 
to the states (p. 44), and note simply that he has not taken this express 
limitation seriously as applied to the national government itself. 
In addition, the idea that the Chief Justice is applying the express 
limitations of the Constitution when they override federalism in aid of 
private property simply will not account for his behavior in cases in-
volving state actions said to amount to takings of private property. 
For, after all, there is no takings clause in the fourteenth amendment, 
17. I should note another unfortunate aspect of Davis' analysis, which happily plays no im-
portant role in her presentation. She appears to believe that there is some conceptual connection 
between Chief Justice Rehnquist's positivism - his insistence that the only source of property or 
liberty in cases involving procedural due process is state law - and his majoritarianism. P. 23. 
At the conceptual level, there is no connection whatever between positivism and majoritarianism; 
one who believes that the only sources oflaw must be positive could well believe that, for exam-
ple, the Constitution is itself a positive law in the required sense despite the anti-majoritarian 
implications of that document. 
18. See, e.g., H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1968). 
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only a due process clause, and the Supreme Court at first held that the 
requirement of compensation was not incorporated into the fourteenth 
amendment. 19 
There is another difficulty, which Davis herself acknowledges. By 
her analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist thinks that federalism is more 
important than private property except where, in his approach to con-
stitutional interpretation, some provision of the Constitution makes 
private property more important than federalism. Yet, as Davis points 
out (pp. 150, 172, 205), that ranking of values cannot be derived from 
the Constitution interpreted according to the Chief Justice's approach. 
For federalism, in Rehnquist's understanding, is a structural aspect of 
the Constitution, which can be enforced by the Supreme Court against 
majoritarian decisions even in the absence of some specific provision in 
the Constitution defending the principle of federalism. Rehnquist's 
position in National League of Cities v. Usery 20 is, of course, the most 
notable statement of this view; but his somewhat diffident observation 
in his dissent to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity 21 that, although he wasn't entirely sure what the right doctrine 
was, he was sure that there was some doctrine that limited congres-
sional authority, is an even better example of his preference for feder-
alism in the face of doctrinal, textual, and other uncertainties. 22 
As Davis notes, "Rehnquist's use of structural analysis to support 
federalism as a principle that is central to the Constitution ... brings 
into question the consistency of his approach to constitutional inter-
pretation" (p. 204). Notice, however, that it was that approach to 
constitutional interpretation that she offered to explain the apparent 
reversal of values in the takings and contracts clause cases. If his ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation is inconsistent, though, it can-
not account for that reversal. In the end, therefore, we are left with a 
simple statement of value: that Chief Justice Rehnquist values federal-
ism more than private property and individual rights, except when he 
thinks that private property or individual rights are more important 
than federalism. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist might not be a right-wing ideologue, if by 
that one means someone fully committed to a consistent program of 
promoting right-wing principles no matter what the consequences. 
19. See Clinton, Substantive Due Process, Selective Incorporation, and the Late-Nineteenth 
Century Overthrow of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 J.L. & POLITICS 499, 527-
28 (1989). 
20. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
21. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
22. Davis makes the point effectively in her discussion of Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 
(1979), where, in the name of federalism, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist would have imposed 
a limitation on state authority to adjudicate claims against other states. Pp. 204-05. She does not 
note, but could, that Hall is a curious case in which to defend federalism, because it is a case in 
which there are federalist interests on both sides. 
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Ideologues like that, of course, rarely if ever become Supreme Court 
Justices. On Davis' evidence, though, William Rehnquist certainly is 
an almost perfect Republican Chief Justice. I do wonder whether we 
need 208 pages to show us that. 
